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Armed drones are now a key component of military strategy; however, little empirical 
research has explored the phenomenon in terms of psychological processes. Previous research 
has emphasised the importance of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992) for structuring 
understandings of and opinions towards foreign policy events (e.g. Rathbun, Kertzer, Reifler, 
Goren, & Scotto, 2016). Using a social representations approach (Elcheroth, Doise, & 
Reicher, 2011; Moscovici, 1961/76), we used a multi-level modelling approach to explore the 
link between values and support for the use of armed drones in the United Kingdom, United 
States of America, and Turkey. In line with our predictions, high priority of self-
transcendence values negatively predicted, and high priority of conservation values positively 
predicted support for armed drones. Furthermore, given our theoretical framework, we 
specified that values should be conceptualised as prioritised or devalued within a particular 
context, and when values were specified as country-level, as well as individual predictors, 
this led to an increase in model fit. These findings are discussed in light of a developing line 
of research on meta-representations and their consequences for political opinion, and 
directions for future research are advanced. 




Previous research within political psychology that has explored the way in which 
people take positions on foreign policy issues and events has tended to focus on individual 
characteristics or prerequisites, including, but not limited to national identification (Hermann, 
Isernia, & Segatti, 2009), perceived trust (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002), perceived threat, 
(Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007) and values (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; 
Rathbun, Kertzer, Reifler, Goren, & Scotto, 2016). By contrast, other work has applied a 
social representations approach (SRA) to shed light on the way in which people come to 
make sense of, as well as take positions on, foreign policy issues and events (e.g. O’Dwyer, 
Lyons, & Cohrs, 2016; Wagner, Valencia, & Elejabarrieta, 1996). The SRA proposes that 
knowledge about such issues is socially-elaborated, and describes particular processes that 
shape the content of this social knowledge. The way in which people come to take different 
positions on foreign policy issues and events needs to be understood as occurring within 
unique social and political contexts. Certain positions towards a foreign policy issue may be 
read as normative or deviant within a given context, for example, or they may be commonly 
interpreted by people with reference to particular value or belief systems. In this sense, the 
ways in which others around us understand, and orient towards, foreign policy issues and 
events will play a role in the positions we ourselves adopt (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 
2011; Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016).  
In this study, we focus on the link between one set of individual characteristics - basic 
human values (Schwartz, 1992) – and support for the use of armed drones. We conceptualise 
values as psychological frameworks which are mobilised by individuals to interpret, 
construct, and evaluate novel phenomena, such as armed drones (e.g. Spini & Doise, 1998). 
Additionally, and, in line with the SRA, we conceptualise values as contextual characteristics, 




which will uniquely predict support for the use of armed drones as well as provide a 
normative value context for individual attitudes.  
The Social Representations Approach  
The theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1961/76) is an explanatory 
framework for the existence of common sense knowledge and the processes which give rise 
to these shared understandings. Two interdependent processes account for the creation, 
change, and maintenance of social representations – objectification and anchoring. 
Objectification relates to “constructing an iconic aspect for a new, difficult to grasp concept, 
theory or idea, which makes it literally visible” (Wagner & Hayes, 2005; p. 208). This might 
denote the linking of imagery or metaphor to the issue; for example representations of the 
Vietnam War are inextricably linked to certain war photographs which now signify this 
particular conflict. The second process, anchoring, connotes the way in which unfamiliar, 
obscure, or remote information is ‘made familiar’ through its accommodation within an 
existing knowledge or belief structure (Moscovici, 1984). The process “involves shared 
references to common meaning systems by people who locate or position themselves 
differently within this common framework” (Clémence, Devos, & Doise, 2001, p. 89). 
Individual differences in social representations of human rights, for example, were organised 
systematically depending on value priorities (Spini & Doise, 1998), perceptions and 
experiences of social conflict (Doise, Spini, & Clémence, 1999), and group memberships 
(Spini & Doise, 1998). Each of these psychological and group-based structures serves as a 
prism through which unfamiliar, novel, or remote phenomena are interpreted, constructed, 
and evaluated.  
Recent work using the SRA has suggested the importance of 'meta-representations' for 




“perceptions of what most others value or reject… along with beliefs regarding what relevant 
others know, think or intend to do more generally” (Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016, p. 662). A 
longitudinal and experimental study conducted at a traditionally left-wing Parisian university 
found that manipulating the perceived social norms about the far-right National Front, 
specifically the belief that other students agreed with their policies, had an effect on political 
expression. Specifically, when students were told that the majority of French students were 
positive about the party, they were less willing to voice opposition towards it by signing up to 
discussion workshops about its politics. However, competing alternative explanations for this 
lower willingness to speak out, such as conflict avoidance (e.g. Mutz, 2002; Vraga et al., 
2015) are also plausible, and reflect a broader debate about the effect of a hostile (or 
otherwise) ‘opinion climate’ on political expression, as well as potential moderators of this 
effect (e.g. Louis et al., 2010; Matthes, Rios Morrison, & Schemer, 2010; Noelle-Neumann, 
1974).  
In a similar vein, other work has sought to model quantitatively the political climate 
and its effect on individual attitudes and behaviours by including measures of the political 
climate at the group (rather than individual) level. Sarrasin and colleagues (2012) conducted 
an analysis of attitudes towards antiracism laws in Switzerland using a multilevel approach. 
In addition to individual psychological factors (e.g., perceived threat), contextual factors were 
also included in the model. Of specific interest here was the ‘ideological climate’ 
(conservative/progressive) of the Swiss canton in which individuals were located, determined 
by the canton’s voting record in national referenda. The analysis showed that a conservative 
opinion climate increased opposition towards antiracism laws over and above the effect of 
individual psychological factors, structural features of the municipality (e.g., proportion of 




suggests that accounting for the shared understandings and normative beliefs tied to particular 
contexts may increase our understanding of individual positions towards political issues.  
We use the SRA to explore the phenomenon of armed drones for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, armed drones are a relatively recent technological development, and social 
representations theory has been usefully applied in various contexts to understand the ways in 
which scientific, technological, and political novelties are integrated into common sense (e.g. 
Gilles et al., 2013; Wagner, Kronberger & Seifert, 2002), as well as to investigate individual 
and group positions on war, peace, and military intervention (Cohrs & O’Dwyer, 2018). 
Secondly, through the process of anchoring, the approach offers an account of the ways in 
which individual differences towards a representation may occur. Following the work of 
Doise and colleagues, we propose that values will operate as organising principles that shape 
systematically different orientations towards the social representation of armed drones across 
different national contexts. Finally, we propose that the understandings and positions of 
individuals and groups towards particular issues cannot be fully understood without 
modelling the social and political climate. Thus the relationship between characteristics 
generally conceptualised at the psychological level, such as values, and support for the use of 
armed drones, needs to be understood in context. By this we mean that values at the 
contextual level will predict support for the use of armed drones, but further, that as values 
will either be prioritised or devalued within a particular national context, the value context 
will also alter the relationships between values at the individual level and attitudes. Thus, we 
understand values as prioritised or devalued by individuals, but also by the contexts in which 
they are located.  
We chose to explore attitudes towards the use of armed drones in three nations – the 
United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Turkey – which were selected primarily 




most extensive, most well-known, and arguably most controversial user of armed drones and 
has conducted drone strikes (both covert and official) in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Somalia and Yemen. The UK has deployed drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but unlike 
the US, does not have a well-defined official drone program as part of its military strategy. A 
further key difference between the US and UK in terms of their drone usage relates to their 
rules of engagement, particularly the ‘targeted killings’ (killing a known individual away 
from formal battlefields) and ‘signature strikes’ (killing an unknown individual whose 
behaviour flags them as terrorist or insurgent), which are components of the US drone 
program, but which have been widely criticised by the international community, including the 
UK. Turkey has recently developed drones with strike capabilities and its use of drones also 
differs from the US and UK in terms of the objectives attached to them; while the US and UK 
have only launched drone strikes abroad, Turkey has used drone strikes in the southeast of the 
country as part of counter-terrorism operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 
in addition to outside its national borders in Iraq and Syria. Thus, each of the countries 
included in this study differ from each other in relation to the scope and extent of their usage 
of armed drones as well as the ends to which they are employed.  
Public Opinion on the Use of Armed Drones 
The use of armed drones or unmanned combat aerial vehicles is, at the time of 
writing, an integral component of military strategy in formal conflict zones such as Syria and 
Iraq. The US is the most prolific and well-known user of these weapons, but, at the time of 
writing, 27 other countries, including the UK, Turkey, Israel, Nigeria, France, and Pakistan, 
had or were in the process of developing drones with attack capabilities (New America 
Foundation, 2017). The use of armed drones is controversial, particularly in the context of US 




moral and legal principles (e.g. just war theory) as well as casting doubt on their strategic 
effectiveness (e.g. Chamayou, 2013; Kaag & Kreps, 2014).  
 Opinion polls conducted between 2011 and 2013, showed that 48 to 86 per cent of 
US respondents supported the use of drone strikes to kill suspected terrorists (Kreps, 2014). 
However, support for the use of armed drones may be influenced by framing effects. In an 
experimental study, when the compatibility of drone strikes with international humanitarian 
law was problematized, US participants were less supportive of drone strikes (Kreps, 2014). 
Research has also indicated that support for drone strikes may be affected by features of the 
operational context, such as the probability of civilian casualties and the characteristics of the 
target of the proposed drone strike (Beier, 2003; Faulker Rogers, 2013; Walsh, 2014). 
Outside of the US, little research has explored attitudes towards armed drones (see Fair, 
Kaltenthaler, & Miller, 2016; Faulker Rogers, 2013) and most research has focused on 
support for US drone strikes. An international survey of participants from twenty countries 
recorded widespread opposition to US drone strikes outside of formal conflict zones (e.g. 
Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan), with disapproval highest in predominantly Muslim countries 
(Pew Research Center, 2014).  
The Value Basis of Foreign Policy Opinion 
Values are “desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as 
guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 521). The relevance of these 
psychological variables to political opinion and behaviour, including foreign policy opinion, 
has been researched extensively, with Schwartz’s theory of basic human values (1992) the 
conceptualisation of values which has been most commonly used. This theory describes ten 
values—security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism, self-direction, 




kinds of behaviour, events and people” (Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010, p. 422, 
emphasis in the original). The theory specifies a particular pattern of relationships between 
these ten different values, with values occupying positions within a circumplex structure 
marked out by the poles of two orthogonal dimensions – conservation/openness to change 
and self-transcendence/self-enhancement. Values which are located nearest to each other in 
the circumplex structure will be positively correlated because they possess similar 
motivational foundations, while values which are distant from each other will be negatively 
correlated because of conflicting underpinning motivations. To illustrate, individuals who 
ascribe high priority to the value of security in their lives will assign less priority to the value 
of stimulation as these values occupy opposite ends of the conservation/openness to change 
dimension and so are distant to each other within the circumplex value structure.  
Given the motivational structure specified by the theory, four superordinate value 
categories may also be formed by combining adjacent values in the value structure (Schwartz, 
2003). Conservation values (tradition, security, and conformity) refer to the maintenance of 
the current social order, self-restraint, and adherence to established current social practices 
and tradition. Opposed to this, openness to change values (self-direction and stimulation) 
relate to “independent action, thought and feeling and readiness for new experience” 
(Schwartz, 2003, p. 269). Self-enhancement values (power and achievement) prioritise the 
pursuit of self-interest at the expense of other individuals and groups if required. The value of 
hedonism shares elements with both self-enhancement and openness to change, however 
most previous research has found it lies closer to the latter values (Schwartz, 2003). Finally, 
self-transcendence values (benevolence and universalism) relate to concern for the welfare of 
other individuals, groups, and society as a whole.  
The value basis of foreign policy opinion has been investigated in relation to (1) the 




including support for the use of armed drones, and (2) the way in which values are predictive 
of broader foreign policy orientations, e.g. cooperative internationalism. On the first point, 
high priority of conformity and low priority of universalism were associated with higher 
levels of support for the Kosovo war among French students (Bègue & Apostolidis, 2000). 
Among German participants, high priority of security, power, conformity, and achievement 
values were positively related to, and high priority of benevolence and universalism were 
negatively related to support for the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars (Cohrs et al., 2005). Using 
data from US participants, Crawford, Wiley, and Ventresco (2014) showed that right-wing 
ideology was positively related to high relevance of the value of security (e.g. to what extent 
did the value of security affect your decision?), which in turn positively predicted support for 
US drone strikes in Pakistan. On the other hand, right-wing ideology negatively predicted 
relevance of universalism, which then negatively predicted support for drone strikes. 
Furthermore, how the drone strikes were framed influenced this process. Particularly, framing 
the drone strikes in terms of civilian casualties predicted relevance of universalism, which 
then negatively predicted support for drone strikes. Conversely, framing the drone strikes as 
necessary in terms of national security predicted relevance of security, which in turn 
positively predicted support for drone strikes.  
As noted above, research has also explored the extent to which values are related to 
broader foreign policy orientations or postures. Among a representative US sample, high 
priority of universalism predicted cooperative internationalism (the propensity to engage 
cooperatively and in a solidaristic fashion with other nations towards the achievement of 
common goals) while high priority of conservation values predicted support for militant 
internationalism, or the perspective that the use of force in international relations is 
legitimate, important, and effective (Rathbun et al., 2016). Self-enhancement values, being 




US participants, Schoen, Rattinger and Pötzschke (2011) reported that high priority of 
conservation values was negatively related to support for international involvement and 
multilateralism, and positively related to support for military force, while associations with 
priority of self-transcendence values displayed the reverse pattern. Openness to change values 
were only significantly related to increased support for multilateralism, while high priority of 
self-enhancement values was linked to decreased support for international involvement and 
increased support for militarism.  
Taken together, this research suggests that values, in particular conservation and self-
transcendence values, are linked to positions on specific foreign policy events and 
phenomena, as well as broader dimensions of foreign policy opinion. However, previous 
work which has examined the relationships between values and support for the use of armed 
drones has been limited to the US context. This study will address this limitation by 
examining the relationship of values to support for the use of armed drones in three contexts 
– the US, UK, and Turkey – each of which uses armed drones to differing extents, and for 
different objectives. Furthermore, we propose that previous research has paid insufficient 
attention to the influence of the socio-political context, which encompasses shared 
understandings and normative beliefs, on individual positions; therefore we believe it 
necessary to adopt both the theoretical and methodological tools to enable us to account for 
the influence of contextual factors.  
The Present Study 
This study was conducted with samples from the US, UK, and Turkey to examine the 
effect of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992) on support for the use of armed drones. Prior 
research on this issue has adopted either a micro perspective (e.g., individuals/values) or 




adopted here to allow us to examine support for the use of armed drones from both micro and 
macro perspectives simultaneously. Thus, individuals are treated in this study as nested 
within the national contexts of the US, UK, and Turkey.  
At the individual level, four superordinate value categories (Schwartz, 2003; Rathbun 
et al., 2016) – self-transcendence, conservation, openness to change, and self-enhancement - 
were used as predictors. Following previous research, we hypothesised that self-
transcendence would negatively, and conservation would positively predict support for the 
use of armed drones (e.g. Crawford et al., 2014; Rathbun et al., 2016). We did not expect 
openness to change or self-enhancement to be related to support. Also at the individual level, 
we included gender, in line with previous research which has suggested that women may be 
less supportive of military intervention than men (e.g. Eichenberg, 2003; Togeby, 1994). We 
further specified age and years of education as individual-level variables. Age was included 
in order to address a possible age-related response bias (detailed below) while we included 
years of education in order to account for the possibility that it may have been related to 
access to written or digital media, which could influence ‘textbook knowledge’. In line with 
our theoretical framework, which underscores the importance of understanding individual 
attitudes as located within particular social and political contexts, we specified the effect of 
values on attitude towards armed drones as random across nations, i.e. the effects of the value 
dimensions were allowed to vary across countries. Finally, we controlled for some other 
contextual variables such as knowledge of drones at both the individual and national level.  
Method 
We adopted a cross-sectional survey format for this study. Data were collected online, 
using an international external panel company between April and May 2016. This company 




pools in the three countries, which they could then accept or reject (see Researchnow, 2017). 
The survey took an average of 18 minutes (with outliers 60.47) to complete, and participants 
were rewarded with website credit which could then be exchanged for vouchers. 
Participants and Sampling Strategy 
Following Stegmueller (2013), we calculated the minimum sample size needed to test 
our hypotheses. We required a sample size of no fewer than 375 participants per country with 
an associated power value of .90. The sample was composed of 1776 participants from three 
countries – the US (N = 573), UK (N = 638), and Turkey (N = 565). Multiple imputation 
analysis showed that participants who completed the survey in less than ten minutes had at 
least one value missing on the study variables, therefore these participants (N = 116) were 
dropped from further analysis.  
We conducted a series of Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) tests with 
an Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithm to determine whether there were systematic 
patterns of missing values on the study variables (Little, 1988; Enders, 2003). Univariate 
analysis showed that younger respondents were less likely to complete items measuring 
support for the use of armed drones. When these attitude items (N = 3) were missing, the 
mean ages of participants from the US, the UK, and Turkey were 38.66, 38.92, and 38.23, 
compared to 48.84, 48.88, and 48.97 when these items remained in the dataset. Through 
careful inspection of the data’s accuracy, 72 participants were dropped from the data. 
Therefore, the final sample was composed of 1588 citizens of the US (488), UK (576), and 
Turkey (524), forty-nine per cent of which were women. All participants were aged 18 years 





Language options were provided to ensure participants’ ease of understanding. The 
survey was written in English by the first author and the second author provided the Turkish 
translation. Participants could select in which language (English or Turkish) they wished to 
complete the survey via a drop-down menu. Eight Turkish participants chose to complete the 
survey in English; all other Turkish participants completed the Turkish-language version.  
Portrait value questionnaire (PVQ). The survey contained a short form of the 
Portrait Value Questionnaire (e.g., Davidov, 2008), which includes 21 items measuring ten 
motivational values (Schwartz, 1992): power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-
direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. Following previous 
work (Rathbun et al., 2016; Schwartz, 2003), self-transcendence was measured using 
benevolence and universalism items, openness to change with  self-direction, stimulation, and 
hedonism items, self-enhancement with power and achievement items, and conservation 
using the items gauging priority of security, conformity, and tradition values. Responses to 
each of these items were measured on a 6-point scale (1 = very much like me; 6 = not like me 
at all) but were transformed before computing the latent mean as explained below so that a 
higher score indicated higher priority of this value.  
Support for the use of armed drones. This was measured using a three-item scale 
(adapted from Crawford et al., 2014, α = .96). Participants were asked to respond to three 
items - “Using armed drones is good military policy”, “I agree with people who support using 
armed drones” and “I do not support the military’s use of armed drones” – on a 6-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). The last item was reversed before calculating the 
overall score. A higher score indicated higher support for the use of armed drones.  
Knowledge about armed drones. Following previous research on social 




‘textbook’ knowledge about armed drones. Participants were asked to indicate whether they 
thought seven facts about drones were true or false, or whether they didn’t know (see 
Appendix S1). Each item which was correctly answered was given one point, giving a 
maximum possible score of seven.  
Conceptual Equivalence of Measurements across Countries  
In order to ensure the conceptual equivalence of values and support for the use of 
armed drones across the countries, we performed a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis 
using R (R Core Team, 2016) and the Lavaan software package (Rosseel, 2012). To examine 
invariance across national groups, a series of models was tested to focus on the equivalence 
of factor loadings, factor covariances, and structural regression paths (Brown, Harris, 
O’Quin, & Lane, 2017). Each of the measurements, except the PVQ, was found to be 
conceptually equivalent across the national groups and provided good fit indices, thus we 
calculated the weighted scores for all measures except the value measures to obtain the 
predicted latent means and standard deviations in terms of the strict invariance model. We 
used the partial strict invariance model to obtain the predicted latent means and standard 
deviations for the PVQ as measurement invariance was partially supported for this measure. 
The detailed results of these analyses are provided in Appendix S2 due to space constraints. 
Analytic Strategy  
A linear mixed effects analysis was conducted with a restricted maximum likelihood 
(REML) estimation method, using R with the Lme4 software package (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). To reduce over-correlation among predictors (Paccagnella, 2006), 
predictor variables for fixed slopes were standardised using the grand mean centre method, 
while random slope variables were standardised using the group mean centre method - the 




effects, the model included the four basic value categories – openness to change, self-
transcendence, self-enhancement, and conservation, and the effects of gender, age, years of 
education, and knowledge of armed drones were controlled in the same model. As random 
effects, we specified the intercepts for the different national contexts as well as the by-context 
random slopes for the effect of values. 
We used REML estimation and the Kenward-Roger adjustment to reduce the inflated 
type-I error rate since the cluster size was limited to three countries (Kenward & Roger, 
2009; McNeish & Stapleton, 2016). In addition to REML estimation, we checked our results 
again using an alternative approach, the Robust Bayesian Linear Mixed-Effects approach 
(Ruli, Sartori, & Ventura, 2017). This was done as an additional precaution to avoid drawing 
theoretical conclusions as a result of biased standard errors due to the small number of 
countries included in the model. Although the likelihood ratio test provides a better 
understanding of model fit (Douglas, 2009), we also provide a calculation of traditional p-
values for each fixed and random effect in the multilevel models, by calculating the 
Kenward-Roger approximation using the Pbkrtest software package in R (Halekoh, & 
Højsgaard, 2014). Besides REML, Maximum Likelihood was also calculated in order to 
produce a p value and facilitate model comparison (Bolker et al., 2009; Pinheiro & Bates, 
2000). Using an extension of Nakagawa and Schielzeth’s R2GLMM method (2013), 
developed by Johnson (2014), two types of variance were calculated using the MuMIn 
software package in R (Barton, 2016). The first - marginal R2- refers to the proportion of total 
variance explained by the fixed variables, while the second - conditional R2- denotes the 






Descriptive statistics for the whole sample as well as by country are presented in 
Table 1. Mean values of support for the use of armed drones and knowledge of armed drones 
were at or just above the scale mid-points.  
------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 here---------------------------------------------- 
A Multilevel Model of Support for the Use of Armed Drones 
Testing the assumptions of the multilevel model. Preliminary analysis did not 
reveal any problems with the assumptions of the multilevel model (e.g. homoscedasticity and 
normality), and no multicollinearity was detected among the variables. By calculating 
Mahalanobis’ distance for each participant, nineteen multivariate outliers were identified with 
a value higher than the cut-off point (29.59). Accordingly, they were also dropped from 
further analysis. Therefore, the total numbers of participants was 1569 (N for Turkey = 520, 
UK = 566, and US = 483). All simple correlations between support for the use of armed 
drones and the four superordinate value categories are presented in Table 2.  
----------------------------------------Insert Table 2 here----------------------------------------------- 
Testing the multilevel model of support for armed drones. Firstly, to determine 
whether there was variability in support across the countries, a random intercept only model, 
also known as an unconditional mixed model (Model A), was tested, to be used as a baseline 
model for the goodness-of-fit of the following models. Shown in Equation 1, 𝜸𝟎𝟎 was the 
overall mean of the dependent variable and 𝑼𝟎𝒋 was the random effect of the countries. 
Therefore, we estimated 𝑼𝟎𝒋 as the variance of the mean for each country around the overall 
mean score of support for the use of armed drones.  
Equation 1: Intercept only model  




The analysis showed that there was far more variation within the nations (1.19) than 
between the nations (0.15), and the mean of support for the use of armed drones across the 
nations was 4.05. The conditional R2 for the intercept only model suggested that 11.41 per 
cent of the variance in support was distributed at the national level. Using the likelihood ratio 
test statistic, we compared the random intercept only model to the ordinary least squares 
model, which suggested overwhelming evidence of country-level effects on support for the 
use of armed drones, Δχ2(1) = 60.54, p < .001.  
In our second model (Model B), we added theoretical covariates into Model A as 
predictors. In this random intercept model, gender, age, years of education, and knowledge of 
drones were specified as fixed slopes. Compared to the intercept only model, Model B 
showed a significant improvement in explaining the variance in support, Δχ2(4) = 69.83, p < 
.001. The fixed effect of gender (β=.14, p.KR < .001) was significant, with women less 
supportive of the use of armed drones. No significant main effect was found for the other 
variables - years of education, age, and knowledge of armed drones. The marginal R2 also 
indicated that 4 per cent of the total variance in support was accounted for by these covariates 
while the conditional R2 for this model suggested that 15 per cent of the variance in support 
for the use of armed drones was distributed at the national level. We also tested the random 
slope model of knowledge of drones, which was close to zero, suggesting that the effect of 
knowledge on support was the same across the countries. A trivial amount (.0002) of 
between-country variance was accounted for by knowledge.  
Model C was our theoretical mixed model in which we tested the relationship 
between values and support for the use of armed drones. To test this, controlling for Model B, 
the fixed effects of the value categories (self-transcendence, conservation, self-enhancement, 




significant improvement in explaining the variance in support for the use of armed drones, 
Δχ2 (9) = 112.08, p < .001.  
As Table 3 shows, after controlling the fixed effects of Model B variables and the 
random effect of knowledge of drones (σ2=.003, s.e.= .017), the main effect of self-
transcendence (β= -.28, p.KR = .007) was as hypothesised, with higher levels of self-
transcendence associated with lower levels of support. The main effect of conservation (β= 
.38, p.KR=.001) was also significant as hypothesized, with higher levels of conservation 
associated with higher levels of support. The effects of predictor and control variables on 
support for the use of armed drones are displayed in Figure 1 (coefficients and 95% CIs for 
Model C are presented using Coefplot2; Bolker, & Su, 2011).  
-------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 here-------------------------------------------- 
Also as expected, self-enhancement and openness were not significantly related to support. In 
this model, the marginal R2 indicated that nine per cent of the total within-nation variance in 
support was accounted for by values (removing the 2% explained by gender). Self-
transcendence explained 3 per cent, and conservation explained 6 per cent of the within-
nation variance in support for the use of armed drones. The conditional R2 for this model was 
.177, thus 18 per cent of the total variance in support was explained by both the fixed and 
random variables. All levels of explained variances and estimations are presented in Table 3. 
-------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 here--------------------------------------------- 
By subtracting the within-nation variance (11%) from the total variance in support 
(18%), it can be seen that conservation and self-transcendence together explained 7 per cent 





 The results of a multilevel model of support for the use of armed drones in the US, 
UK, and Turkey revealed that there were country differences in support, with the Turkish 
participants endorsing their use to the greatest extent, followed by the US and UK 
participants. In each of the countries, conservation and self-transcendence values were, 
respectively, positively and negatively related to support, and women were less likely to 
support the use of armed drones. Openness to change and self-enhancement were not related 
to support. Additionally, we postulated that values should be conceptualised as contextual as 
well as individual predictors, and when we specified this in our model, it resulted in a 
significant increase in model fit.  
 The analysis supports work which has emphasised the link between values and 
positions on foreign policy issues and events, as well as with broader foreign policy 
orientations (e.g. Cohrs et al., 2005; Rathbun et al., 2016). In line with this research, support 
for the use of armed drones was linked to high priority of conservation values, which are 
those linked to concerns about maintenance of the status quo and protection of the ingroup. 
Conversely, high priority of self-transcendence values (those linked to concern for the 
welfare of others) was negatively related to support for the use of armed drones. While at the 
individual level, openness to change was related to support, when included in our multilevel 
model, this was no longer the case. As expected, due to its focus on individual self-interest, 
which may not be as relevant in the domain of foreign policy, self-enhancement was not 
related to support for the use of armed drones. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
support for the use of armed drones is anchored in a comparable way to positions on other 
foreign policy and military issues.   
 However, we treated these values as contextual, as well as individual factors. Values, 
such as those related to conservation and self-transcendence, we proposed, would be more or 




support at the individual level; however, values in context (specified at the country-level) 
were also related to support for the use of armed drones. This is key as it suggests that values, 
which are signalled as normative in the social/political milieu, may have a role to play in 
explaining support for the use of armed drones, and foreign policy opinion more generally. 
Our analysis complements and adds to existing research using a social representational 
approach, which models ideological climates and meta-representational processes in 
explanations of individual positions (e.g. Elcheroth et al., 2011; Sarrasin et al., 2012).  
Across the three countries, support for the use of armed drones was not related to 
either participants' level of knowledge about drones, or the years of education. It was not then 
the case that an absence (or excess) of textbook or ‘factual’ knowledge about the technology 
was driving individual positions. By comparison, values at both the individual and country 
level were more important predictors. These findings, taken together, may suggest that, in the 
foreign policy domain at least, political elites may have a lot of scope to frame policies in 
ways which tie them to particular values. This could mute the potential of citizen resistance to 
the use of armed drone strikes, as elites may choose to frame policies or military actions in 
ways which (1) chime with their own values, on a personal level but which also (2) ‘fit’ with 
the values which are legitimised in that particular context. This assertion supports previous 
research which has found public opinion on drone strikes to be influenced by the ways in 
which they are framed and tied to particular values (e.g. Crawford et al., 2014).  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that has explored people's general 
attitudes towards the use of armed drones from a comparative standpoint. Interestingly, and 
contrary to the only survey of public opinion on drones in Turkey (Pew Research Center, 
2014), Turkish participants reported the highest levels of support for armed drones here. 
While our results are not based on a representative sample, they still suggest that Turkish 




the use of armed drones in general. This is in line with previous research which has 
emphasised the importance of features of the operational context for attitudes towards drone 
strikes (e.g. Faulkner Rogers, 2013; Walsh, 2015). As the previous survey of Turkish opinion 
referred to the US drone program in non-designated conflict areas, it seems plausible that the 
perceived international legitimacy of drone strikes is another such feature (Kreps, 2014). 
Further cross-national research with representative participant samples is needed to explore 
this possibility further.   
There are a number of limitations to this study. Firstly, although we tried to mitigate 
the inflated risk of a Type I error associated with multilevel modelling, the study would have 
benefited from the addition of data from more countries (McNeish & Stapleton, 2016). While 
these countries were selected to optimise differences in experiences of the use of armed 
drones, nevertheless the key finding of this study - that the value context influences the 
relationship between values and support for the use of armed drones - would have been 
stronger had more countries been included. In particular, the addition of data from countries 
in the Middle East in which armed drone strikes have been, or are currently being deployed 
would have provided a stronger test of our contextual hypothesis as well as within-nation 
support for the use of armed drones against another country through perceived international 
legitimacy.  
Secondly, our analysis displayed a systematic non-response bias as younger people 
were less likely to complete the measure gauging support for the use of armed drones. One 
possible account of this finding may be related to interest in of awareness of foreign policy 
issues, which could plausibly be lower among younger adults. Due to this observed bias, we 
included age as a covariate in our subsequent analyses in order to account for the role of this 




response bias need to be further investigated through research on the way in which younger 
adults understand and orient towards armed drones.  
Thirdly, much of the polling on drone strikes asks people to consider them as an 
alternative to other forms of intervention, rather than asking for their judgements on the 
acceptability of strikes in isolation. Indeed research has suggested that people may favour 
drone strikes over other types of operations in specific circumstances, but not in others 
(Walsh & Schulzke, 2015). As with alternative military operations, it would be expected that 
different features of the proposed operation, such as expectations of operational success 
(Lyon & Malone, 2009), would also influence individual positions. We used a relatively blunt 
measure to gauge general attitudes due to our interest in a specific multilevel hypothesis. 
However, further research, particularly using qualitative methods, would be useful here to 
disentangle the process in which citizens engage; weighing up these relevant operational 
features against each other, as well as other military options, to come to a decision (O'Dwyer 
et al, 2016).  
While our analysis suggests that variation in support for armed drones across the three 
countries may be related to value priorities as individual and contextual variables, 
nevertheless other explanations of these differences are possible, and would be fruitful 
avenues for future research. Perceived security threat has been found to be a significant 
predictor of support for military action in the US (Huddy et al., 2007). Given the proximity of 
Turkey to areas in which drone strikes occur, and the existence there of two prominent 
sources of domestic security threat (Islamist, Kurdish), it also seems likely that perceived 
national security threat may influence support for the use of armed drones. Previous research 
has also emphasised the importance of national identity as a multi-dimensional construct (e.g. 




al., 2009) thus differences on these dimensions of national identity may be another 
explanation of the between-country differences in attitudes.  
Furthermore, while this study utilised Schwartz’s theory of human values (e.g. 1992), 
which are conceptualised as psychological properties of individuals, the study of the 
relationship between foreign policy opinion and values could also be usefully extended by 
integrating Schwartz’s theory of cultural values (e.g. 1994), which are the values which are 
prioritised by cultures for fulfilling societal goals. From aggregated individual data, this 
theory specifies three dimensions across which cultures will differ in their priorities: 
autonomy/embeddedness, egalitarianism/hierarchy, and harmony/mastery. According to this 
theoretical framework, culture is external to individual psychological functioning, and so, 
these values are determined on the basis of aggregate rather than individual data. Research 
which has examined the effect of values on political behaviour and opinion, including foreign 
policy opinion, has tended to focus on the values as individual rather than cultural factors. 
However, clearly the values which an individual prioritises will be oriented pragmatically to 
those which are emphasised as cultural values (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), therefore future 
research needs also to model these cultural values in its analyses. 
Guided by the SRA, this study utilised the novel technique of multilevel modelling to 
investigate support for the use of armed drones across national contexts, and so makes the 
case for its wider usage by researchers working with this theoretical framework. However, 
we acknowledge that in order to understand the process by which social representations of 
armed drones are shaped by value contexts, the use of other methods is necessary. For 
example, future research could examine media representations of armed drones, which would 
shed light on the different arguments which are mobilised to justify or critique the use of 
drone strikes, and to identify particular frames which are applied to the technology in order to 




one salient objectification of armed drones which has served to legitimate their continued 
usage, and its prevalence in the media would be potentially fruitful to examine.  
To conclude, our results show that basic human values, particularly conservation and 
self-transcendence values, matter for explanations of support for armed drones. Our adoption 
of the SRA and the methodological technique of multilevel modelling enabled us to find that 
values, when specified as contextual (country-level) factors, were also significant predictors 
of support for the use of armed drones. Thus, we suggest here that values should not just be 
conceptualised as individual characteristics, but also as part of the broader meta-
representational fabric, which are legitimised, prioritised or devalued within a particular 
social/political context. In effect, values need to be understood as properties of citizens and 
the contexts in which they are located, for a fuller appreciation of their role in explanations of 
individual positions towards foreign policy issues.  
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Means and standard deviations for SUAD, age, years of education, knowledge of armed drones, and basic human values 
Measure Turkey UK US Total Sample 
N  524 576 488 1588 
SUAD 4.47(1.07) 3.66(1.13) 4.01(1.09) 4.04(1.14) 
Age 33.88(10.63) 44.52(15.47) 44.11(15.35) 40.91(14.84) 
Years of education     14.79(2.99)         15.00(4.10)         15.27(3.07)             15.01(3.46) 
Knowledge  3.60(1.27) 4.56(1.20) 4.61(1.17) 4.26(1.30) 
Self-enhancement 2.83(1.15) 3.42(0.98) 3.26(0.96) 3.18(1.06) 
Self-transcendence 2.25(1.29) 2.75(1.03) 2.57(1.09) 2.53(1.17) 
Openness to change 2.75(1.24) 3.55(0.97) 3.43(1.01) 3.25(1.13) 
Conservation 2.39(1.19) 2.97(0.91) 2.76(0.97) 2.71(1.04) 






Pearson correlations of SUAD with basic human value categories 
Measure SUAD Self-enhancement Self-transcendence Openness to Change 
SUAD     
Self-enhancement -0.03    
Self-transcendence     -0.13**  0.41**   
Openness to change   -0.06* 0.66** 0.68**  
Conservation      0.21** -0.12** -0.32** -0.59** 
Note: SUAD = support for the use of armed drones. 





Table 3     
Multilevel regression models predicting SUAD 
 
Parameter 
Model A Model B Model C 




   
Intercept 4.052 (.228)* 4.058 (.263)* 4.051  (.237)* 
Age   .007 (.001) .006  (.071) 
Gender   .329 (.055)* .329  (.053)* 
Years of education   -.007 (.008) .000  (.007) 
Knowledge of armed drones   .067 (.024) .074  (.024) 
Self-enhancement     .007  (.033) 
Self-transcendence     -.268  (.072)* 
Openness to change     -.010  (.038) 
Conservation     .381  (.061)* 
Residual Variance 
      
Country-level variance 0.153 (0.391) 0.205  0.165  
Individual variance 1.190 (1.09) 1.141  1.060  
Log likelihood (χ2) 2398.193  2377.126  2303.9  




   
R2m   .039  .095  
R2c .114  .185  .222  
*p < .05, Gender (0 = Women, 1 = Men)  







Note: Gender (0 = Women, 1 = Men) 
Figure 1: The effects of predictor and control variables (coefficients and 95% CIs) on support 







Table 1  






1 Unmanned combat aerial vehicles are fully autonomous and do not 
require the involvement of humans to carry out strikes.  
False 
2 MQ-1 Predator is the nickname of a specific model of drone True 
3 All ‘drones’ used by the UK/US/Turkish military are armed.  False 
4 Israel is the world’s largest exporter of armed drones and drone 
technology.  
True 
5 Armed drones have never been used outside a conventional United 
Nations authorised armed conflict.  
False 
6 Osama bin Laden was killed by an armed drone strike. False 







Measurement Invariance across the USA, UK, and Turkey  
In order to ensure the conceptual equivalence of values and attitudes towards armed 
drones across the countries, a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis was performed using R 
and the Lavaan software package (Rosseel, 2012). To examine invariance across national 
groups, a series of models were tested to focus on the equivalence of factor loadings 
(configural and week factorial), factor covariances (strong invariance), and structural 
regression paths (strict invariance). Before testing these models, the model for each country 
was tested separately. In the configural invariance model, all items of the corresponding 
measure were freely estimated. Following that, we compared sequentially more constrained 
models to a less constrained model. These models were: a weak factorial model, in which the 
factor loadings were constrained to be equal across national groups, a strong invariance 
model in which both the factor loadings and intercept of items were constrained to be equal, 
and a strict invariance model in which error variances were constrained along with factor 
loadings and intercepts. Although the relative chi-square test has been suggested as a global 
test for testing the congruence between the data and the theoretical model (e.g. Carmines & 
McIver, 1981; Marsh & Hocevar, 1985), several other fit indices such as RMSEA, CFI, TLI, 
AIC, and SRMR were also used to assess model fit given its sensitivity to sample size. After 
conceptual and statistical equivalence of measurements were established, latent variables 
were calculated to further use in study analyses by predicting their means and standard 
deviations based on the invariance model.  
Multigroup CFA on portrait value questionnaire. The measurement model, which 
was tested separately for each country, indicated similar goodness of fit indices (see Table 
S1). Then, the four value dimensions, namely openness to change, self-transcendence, self-




configural model fit the data adequately, 2 (549, N= 1784) = 3336.127, p<. 001; CFI=.86, 
TLI =.84, SRMR = .08, and RMSEA = .09. Compared to the configural model, the weak 
factorial model, in which the factor loadings were constrained to be equal across national 
groups, 2 (583, N= 1784) = 3456.111, p<. 001; CFI=.86, TLI =.85, SRMR = .09, and 
RMSEA = .09, suggested that the factor loading could be assumed to be equal since CFI 
(.005) was smaller than proposed cut-off point .01, but 2 significantly increased, 2 (34) 
=120.111, p<.001 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). However, the strong invariance model, in 
which both the factor loadings and intercepts of items were constrained to be equal, 2 (617, 
N= 1784) = 3832.451, p<. 001; CFI=.84, TLI =.84, SRMR = .09, and RMSEA = .09, 
revealed some systematic response bias on the scale across the countries. According to model 
comparison to test for weak and strong invariance, besides the differences in chi-square 
values between the models, 2 (34) =376.34, p<.001; a significant change in CFI was 
found, CFI (.017). Finally, the strong invariance model was compared to the strict 
invariance model, in which error variances were constrained along with factor loadings and 
intercepts, 2 (659, N= 1784) = 4088.675, p<. 001; CFI=.83, TLI =.84, SRMR = .09, and 
RMSEA = .09. A significant increase in chi-square, 2 (42) =256.224, p<.001, and a 
relatively large increase in CFI, CFI (.011), suggested that the data did not meet the strict 
invariance assumption.  
The model was examined further in terms of individual parameters in both the scalar 
invariance and strict invariance models to consider partially scalar and strict invariance 
models. According to the scalar invariance results, the intercepts of item 11 (“It is important 
to her/him to make her/his own decisions about what she/he does. She/He likes to be free and 
not depend on others”), item 10 (“Having a good time is important to her/him. She/He likes 




told. She/He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching”) 
had the largest differences across the countries. The intercepts of item 11 for the UK, USA, 
and Turkey were 2.44, 2.49, and 2.84 respectively. The intercepts of item 10 for the UK, 
USA, and Turkey were 3.51, 3.63, and 3.10 respectively. The intercepts of item 7 for the UK, 
USA, and Turkey were 3.60, 3.33, and 2.98 respectively. Therefore, these intercepts were set 
to be free across the countries, and the CFI (.007) decreased under the cut-off point 
accordingly. Regarding the strict invariance results, the residual of item 2 (“It is important to 
him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things”) differed the most 
across the countries: .07 (UK), .12 (USA) and .08 (Turkey). Therefore, these residuals were 
set free across the countries, and CFI (.009) decreased under the cut-off point accordingly. 
All fit indices and model comparisons are presented in Table S2. Due to the fact that 
measurement invariance was partially supported, the weighted scores were calculated to 
obtain predicted latent means and standard deviations by using the partial strict invariance 
model. 
Multigroup CFA on attitudes towards the use of armed drones. The results 
indicated that the configural model fit the data perfectly, 2 (0, N= 1820) = 0, NA; CFI=1, 
TLI =1, SRMR = 0, and RMSEA = 0. Compared to the configural model, the weak factorial 
model, in which factor loadings were constrained to be equal across national groups, 2 (4, 
N= 1820) = 15.360, p=.004; CFI=.996, TLI =.99, SRMR = .04, and RMSEA = .07 suggested 
that the factor loadings could be assumed to be equal since CFI (.004) was smaller than the 
proposed cut-off point .01, but 2 significantly increased, 2 (4) =15.360, p=.004 (Cheung 
& Rensvold, 2002). Besides, the strong invariance model, in which both factor loadings and 
intercepts of items were constrained to be equal, 2 (8, N= 1820) = 33.069, p<.001; CFI=.99, 




be equal since CFI (.005) was smaller than the proposed cut-off point. However, the strong 
invariance model, in which error variances were constrained along with factor loadings and 
intercepts, 2 (14, N= 1820) = 206.862, p<.001; CFI=.93, TLI =.95, SRMR = .08, and 
RMSEA = .015, revealed some systematic response bias on the scale across countries. A 
significant increase in chi-square, 2 (6) =173.793, p<.001, and a relatively large increase 
in CFI, CFI (.06), suggested that the data did not meet the strict invariance assumption. 
Regarding the strict invariance results, the residuals of reverse item 3, “I do not 
support the military’s use of armed drones” (.61, .65 and .91 for the UK, USA and UK 
respectively) and item 2 “I agree with people who support using armed drones” (.12, .11 and 
.27) differed the most across the countries. Therefore, these residuals were set free across the 
countries, and CFI (.003) decreased under the cut-off point accordingly. Because the 
measurement was the same across the national groups, the weighted scores were calculated to 
obtain predicted latent means and standard deviations in terms of the strong invariance 
model. 
When using a multilevel modelling approach, it is not common practice to report 
Cronbach’s alpha for measures, given that this statistic does not provide a measure of the 
reliability of the measure between countries. However, for additional information, we 
calculated the general and country-specific Cronbach’s alpha for support for the use of armed 
drones. For the overall sample, alpha was .95, while it was .96, .96, and .92 for the USA, UK, 






Separate group model indices for Portrait Value Questionnaire 
 
Turkey UK USA 
CFI 0.934 0.778 0.827 
TLI 0.924 0.745 0.802 
RMSEA 0.075 0.103 0.095 
SRMR 0.055 0.101 0.088 







Results of multigroup confirmatory factor analysis of Portrait Value Questionnaire  




All groups 2664.29 (183) .09 .07 .88 Na Na 
The USA 1134.77 (183) .10 .09 .83 Na Na 
Turkey (770.59 (183) .08 .06 .93 Na Na 
The UK 1430.77 (183) .10 .10 .78 Na Na 
Configural Invariance 3336.12 (549) .09 .08 .86 Na Na 
Weak (Metric) 
Invariance 
3456.11 (583) .09 .09 .86 .004*** Not-exist 
Strong (Scalar) 
Invariance 
3832.45 (617) .09 .09 .84 .017 Exist 
Strict Invariance 4088.68 (659) .09 .09 .83 .011 Exist 
Partial Scalar 
Invariance (Item 1 and 
6 free) 
3490.53 (577) .09 .08 .85 .007*** Not-exist 
Partial Strict Invariance 
(Item 6 free) 
3586.44 (589) .09 .08 .85 .009*** Not-exist 
 
 
 
 
